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Abstract
This paper examines how the Barisan Nasional (National Front, BN) coalition has held power in
Malaysia since that country’s independence in 1957. The first of two perspectives taken in this
examination looks at the practical impediments to opposition party participation during general
elections. This is refracted through the prism of the campaign during the 2004 general elections
of a Parti KeADILan Rakyat candidate. The second perspective looks at the broader cultural
environment in which elections occur in Malaysia. In particular, the BN plays upon popular fears
of a recurrence of ethnic violence that occurred in 1969 when opposition parties polled strongly to
portray itself as the keeper of the country’s peace. The examination of both practical mechanisms
and the cultural environment allow a more complete understanding of how the BN maintains
its political dominance in Malaysia. (Manuscript received November 12, 2006; accepted for
publication February 11, 2007)
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Die Partei Barisan Nasional (BN) ist die bestimmende Kraft im politischen Prozess Malaysias seit
1957. Die vorliegende Analyse stellt sich in diesem Zusammenhang die Frage, wie diese Dominanz
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Kampagne der BN im Jahre 1969, bei der die Angst vor ethnischen Unruhen geschürt wurde,
im Hinblick auf die Dominanz der Regierungspartei erklärt werden. (Manuskript eingereicht am
12.11.2006; zur Veröffentlichung angenommen am 11.02.2007)
Keywords: Malaysia, Parteien, Barisan Nasional, UMNO, Dominanz, Wahlen
Der Autor
Julian C. H. Lee ist Doktorand an der School of Social And Environment Enquiry der Universität
Melbourne, Australien. Seine kürzlich eingereichte Doktorarbeit trägt den Titel Dilemmas in
Democracy: Islam, Politics and Activism. An der Universität Melbourne war er als Gastdozent und
alsTutor für Ethnologie tätig. Lee hat Buchrezensionen in den ZeitschriftenCritique of Anthropology
und The Australian Journal of Anthropology veröffentlicht. Sein Artikel, “The Narrative Imperative“,
erschien im Anthropological Forum im Jahre 2005. E-Mail: julianl@unimelb.edu.au
40 40
40 40
40 Julian C. H. Lee
Introduction
Malaysia’s Barisan Nasional (National Front, BN) coalition has held power
since independence in 1957. During its administration, it has lost its two-thirds
majority in parliament only once, in a brief but formative period in 1969. This
two-thirds majority enables the BN to make and amend laws unilaterally.
The BN is composed of numerous parties, but is dominated by three ethni-
cally oriented ones: The United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), The
Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC).
Of these, UMNO is the predominant party. It bills itself as the protector of the
interests of the ethnic Malay population of Malaysia. According to a census con-
ducted in 2001, Malaysia’s population is 53 percent Malay, 26 percent Chinese,
eight percent Indian, and the balance being made up of Orang Asli (Original
People, indigenous Malaysians) and others (Malaysia 2001). The MCA and
MIC portray themselves as representing the interests of the Chinese and Indian
communities respectively.
Even though the three major ethnic groups are represented within the BN,
William Case writes that,
a set of institutions has emerged that, while formally democratic, in
fact yield a pattern of executive supremacy, UMNO party dominance, and
ethnic preference for Malays (2001:46).
Although these institutions are formally democratic, Case writes, rule-bending
and arbitrary law enforcement have “become so pervasive that the regime must
be adjudged as falling outside the ‘democratic’ category altogether and belonging
to a separate category of pseudodemocracy” (2001:46).
In this paper, I seek to describe how the BN and UMNO maintain their
dominance of Malaysian politics. My description takes two perspectives, both
of which are refracted through the prism of Malaysia’s 2004 general elections.
The first of these is an examination of the practical impediments to opposition
party participation in Malaysian elections. Refracted through the prism of
the experiences of the campaign team of the opposition political party, Parti
KeADILan Rakyat (The People’s Justice Party, KeADILan) during Malaysia’s
general elections in 2004, I describe the various mechanisms at the disposal of
the BN, such as the media and state apparatuses. I begin by relating the events
of a night during a KeADILan candidate’s campaign in the state of Selangor to
give a grounded illustration of the practical impediments that opposition parties
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face. I also describe in this first section some of the responses of these people to
their situation which includes police surveillance and the arbitrary enforcement
of law.
In the second section of this paper, I turn to an examination of how UMNO in
particular, and the BN secondarily,maintains dominance through its manipulation
of certain popular fears; namely, that any usurpation of UMNO or ethnic Malay
political precedence will lead to social instability and a repeat of the communal
violence that occurred in 1969 when Chinese dominated opposition parties
deprived the BN of its two-thirds majority. The approach taken in this section is
thus cultural and historical as I examine how this association was formed and
how it is maintained. Both the practical and cultural perspectives are important
in developing a more complete understanding of the political dominance enjoyed
by the BN and by UMNO in particular.
1 Practical Impediments to Opposition Party Participation in
Malaysian General Elections
1.1 The KeADILan Ceramah
On Wednesday 17 March 2004, four days prior to polling day in Malaysia’s
general elections, KeADILan candidate, Sivarasa Rasiah was to have a ceramah
(see below) in the federal parliament seat for which he was standing. At the time,
that seat, Petaling Jaya South, was held by Donald Lim, a BN coalition candidate
from the constituent MCA.
A ceramah in the context of an election is essentially a meet-your-candidate
session. It is held at a public place and five or so speakers, including the candidate,
will introduce the candidate and speak about pertinent issues to those who attend.
Ceramah are an important means by which opposition party candidates make
contact with the electorate because the mainstream media is under the thumb
of the BN coalition. Coverage in the print and electronic media (excepting the
internet) is poor for opposition parties and, when it does occur, the reporting is
often unfavourable. Indeed, control of the media is one of the often cited three
M’s that the BN has at its disposal, the other two being money and government
machinery (i.e. state infrastructure).
Although opposition parties still make appeals to the mainstream media by
supplying themwith press statements and by having press conferences, opposition
party candidates employ other strategies for disseminating their message. These
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other means include displaying posters in public places, leafleting mailboxes,
“loudhailing” (addressing the public using a megaphone), personally meeting
constituents, and holding ceramah. Ceramah are often held outdoors, in the
evening, and require a police permit. This permit is valid only for a particular
time and place.
Sivarasa’s campaign team organised a ceramah for almost every night of
the eight day campaign period. For Wednesday 17 March, a desirable venue
had been secured with police permission some days earlier. In addition to
claiming a strategic position, various logistical considerations must be taken into
account when preparing a ceramah, including the provision of a viable stage and
appropriate lighting and sound amplification. For Wednesday 17 March 2004, a
desirable venue had been secured with police permission some days earlier.
On this day I had been helping Sivarasa by accompanying him and a few
others on a meet-and-greet tour of Taman Medan, one of the poorer areas within
Petaling Jaya South. When we returned to the bilik gerakan (campaign centre) we
were informed by a harried campaigner that the police had revoked the permit
for the original venue and relocated the KeADILan ceramah to a padang (field,
often used for recreation). The good venue that KeADILan had booked was
going to be used by Donald Lim and his team.
Some volunteers went to the new ceramah site while other volunteers remained
at the bilik gerakan to continue other tasks such as making banners out of posters,
placing these banners around the constituency, constructing wooden signposts
which could be hammered into the ground, monitoring the media and organising
the days to come.
When we arrived at the venue, the padang was in darkness and looked
desolate. Its redeeming feature was that it was bordered by houses from which
residents might emerge out of curiosity. None the less, Sivarasa’s team set to
work, turning an old lorry into a stage and stringing up as many banners and
posters as they could to make it festive and evidently a KeADILan ceramah. After
some fretfulness during the setting-up of the electrical generator and the lighting
and sound, the stage began to take shape and became functional.
Despite the late notice that the residents in the area had of the ceramah –
some were alerted by a volunteer driving around and loudhailing into houses –
approximately 20 to 30 people attended it. However, as an effective means of
“reaching the people”, and as an effective use of manpower and resources, I had
my doubts. Apart from the forced venue change, there are two other aspects of
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this ceramah that are noteworthy.
First, present at this ceramah, loitering behind the rest of the audience, was
a member of the Special Branch of the police. He was pointed out to me by
some of the other volunteers and was distinctive by his conspicuous attempt to
appear inconspicuous. This man who frequently spoke into his mobile phone
and who never made eye-contact with anyone was the source of little more
than mere recognition by the other volunteers who troubled themselves only in
pointing him out to me. Indeed, surveillance by Special Branch officers, who are
commonly referred to as SBs, is the norm for any public event organised by an
opposition party or an non-government organisation (NGO).
A second noteworthy occurrence at the ceramah was that while one of the
KeADILan volunteers was taking photographs for the campaign website, he took
a photo of a woman who subsequently became distressed. I was told that she
was distressed because she did not want to be photographed at an opposition
party event.
When the ceramah concluded I returned to the bilik gerakan and joined a few
other dedicated volunteers who sat on the floor, folding leaflets to be distributed
the following day. While doing this, a film crew, purportedly from Bernama, the
government owned news agency, came ostensibly to do a story.
At one point during the film crew’s visit, I observed the cameraman filming
at close proximity the lists and charts that were posted on the walls and doors.
These contained details relating to campaign volunteers, tasks and dates. I asked
one of the experienced volunteers why they would be filming the wall so closely.
Anne James, Sivarasa’s wife, who was sitting next to me, remarked merrily that I
had been “corrupted.” I asked her what she meant and she explained that now I,
too, was suspicious of people but that, indeed, “they could be undercover SBs
for all we know.”
1.2 An Unconditional Triumph
The BN coalition won the 2004 general elections in what has been described as an
“unconditional triumph” (Economist Intelligence Unit Viewswire 2004) and “a
landslide victory” in which “voters rejected the Islamic conservatism of Pas [the
opposition Islamic party] . . .and gave the thumbs up to Prime Minister Abdullah
Badawi’s reformist agenda and moderate Islamic policies” (Jayasankaran 2004).
S. A. Jayasankaran of the Far Eastern Economic Review cites a number of reasons
for this victory including the superiority of the “slick and inoffensive” BN
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campaign strategy, the diminution of the Anwar Ibrahim issue (although he was
still imprisoned), and a rejection of “the Islamic conservatism of Pas.”
Under the heading “Landslide Victory: The ruling National Front coalition
rebounds” was a table (see table 1) with the election’s bare statistical results:
Table 1 Election results
Parliament
Year 1999 2004
Number of seats 193 219
Contested Won Contested Won
National Front 193 148 219 198
Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) 63 27 84 7
Democratic Action Party (DAP) 49 10 44 12
National Justice Party (PKR) 59 5 59 1
Independent 28 0 29 1
Source: Jayasankaran 2004.
Indeed, with the BN winning over ninety percent of the parliamentary seats, the
victory does appear to be a landslide. The poor result for Parti Islam SeMalaysia
(The Malaysian Islamic Party, PAS) too would appear to justify the comment
from the Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWire that the election results “may
herald a shift in the political debate (such as it exists) in Malaysia away from
Islam” (Economist Intelligence Unit Viewswire 2004).
However, the results cannot be taken at face value. When citing statistics
such as the percentage of seats won by the BN, authors, especially in magazines
and newspapers, usually overlook systematic biases that greatly favour the ruling
coalition. Similarly, seldom acknowledged are cultural phenomena that inhibit
opposition parties and support for them. As my earlier account would attest,
some of these phenomena are observable only when on the ground during an
election. Jayasankaran, however, does little more than note that the ninety
percent victory of seats by the BN came from sixty-four percent of the popular
vote and that both these percentages are records for the coalition.
The events I reported above from Wednesday 17 March 2004 are indicative
of some obstacles that opposition parties face during general elections. There are
many rules and laws that impede opposition parties farmore than ruling coalition
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parties. Furthermore, laws are often enforced when opposition parties appear
to infringe them while they are overlooked when the BN flouts them. Some
institutions, such as the police and the Electoral Commission, are demonstrably
not independent of the ruling coalition despite being ostensible functionaries
of the state and not partisan to particular parties. While I treat the causes of
“ethnic preference” for Malays in the second section of this paper, I turn now to
an outlining of some of those institutions and practices that impede opposition
parties and so enable the maintenance of UMNO-BN political dominance.
1.3 The Media
One of these impediments is the biased coverage of political news in the main-
stream media. This is the first of the BN’s three M’s. The mainstream print
and electronic media require their operating licences to be renewed annually by
the government. Thus, those media that are not more or less owned directly by
government interests are otherwise cowed by coercive legislation in the form of
the Printing Presses Ordinance. As of its latest revision in 1988, judicial review
of a minister’s decision to revoke or deny a permit is impossible if the minis-
ter is satisfied that public order may be prejudiced by the publication (Annuar
2002:128). The threat of suspension is real as, in 1987, three local newspapers,
The Star, Sin Chew Jit Poh and Watan, had their licences suspended. In 2002,
some issues of the international newsmagazines Newsweek, Time and the Far
Eastern Economic Review were blocked from distribution in Malaysia. The
Internal Security Act (ISA) has also been deployed against media staff on the
grounds that they compromised national security (see Annuar 2002:151, and
passim. for a fuller discussion of the state of the media in Malaysia). Otherwise
editors have been dismissed for displeasing the wrong minister (Case 2005:218).
Even though Malaysians are often sceptical of news reports and aware that
the media is biased in its reporting, it can nevertheless be used to subtly influence
the political climate in anticipation of events such as the 2004 elections. In
the lead up to those elections, a number of people suggested to me that the
extensive news coverage of Haitian riots in the news was not a coincidence. The
media also frequently carried stories in separate articles in which BN politicians
made references to Malaysia’s inter-ethnic harmony. A number of critics of
the government suggested that the intention was to remind people of the riots
of May 1969 (see below) which occurred days after the BN lost its two thirds
majority in parliament and to fuel the belief that BN rule was necessary for
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social stability. Syed Husin Ali, a former academic and current vice-president
of KeADILan, has noted that “in every election the government resorts to fear
tactics by manipulating public memory of this tragedy” (Ali 2001:126). During
the 1999 Malaysian general elections, the media linked the political upheaval in
Indonesia with the killings of Chinese there to suggest that any support for the
opposition in Malaysia may have a similar effect. The intention was to frighten
the Chinese voting bloc in particular into electoral conservatism by recalling the
memory of 1969.
Opposition parties have access to the foreign media and their own party
organs, however. But the foreign media, whose stories must be especially brief
and consumable, frequently simplify matters and take a great deal at face value.
The foreign media’s penetration withinMalaysia, where itmatters in this instance,
is limited and an awareness of the sensitivities of the Malaysian government most
likely result in self-censorship. Party organs face other restrictions. Ali notes
that party papers require permits and that, whereas Harakah, the PAS organ, was
once a twice a week publication, its permit restricts it now to publication twice
a month. Otherwise, inordinate delays in procuring licences are experienced
(ibid.:122).
Finally and briefly, although the internet is by and large not restricted, there
have been occasions when news websites and bloggers have been threatened for
allegedly compromising national security. Otherwise, access to some news sites,
such as Malaysiakini.com, are available only to paid subscribers.
1.4 Money
The second of the BN’s three M’s is its access to money. Although Section 19 of
the Elections Act constrains candidates from spending more than MYR200,000
(USD56,000)1 in their campaigns, it is widely assumed that in actuality, the
amount spent by BN candidates far exceeds that limit (for similar comments with
regard the 1999 general elections see Weiss 2000:432).
It is worth relating here a phenomenon I witnessed in the 2004 elections. One
day during the campaign period I brought to the attention of Sivarasa’s team that
many BN billboards were having sections of them covered over. The sections
that were being covered were first those that said, “Pilihan Yang Bijak: Barisan
1 This and subsequent conversions of Malaysian ringgit to US dollars were correct in May 2006.
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Nasional” (“The Clever Choice: National Front”), and second, the section which
showed the BN symbol next to a checked box, such as one would find on a voting
form (see figure 1). One proffered explanation was that if the billboards were
to be counted in the cost of the campaign budget, the limit would be evidently
exceeded, and just on billboards alone. By covering the sections that indicated
that the billboards were directly related to the elections, the BN could claim that
they were general advertisements that were not related to any campaign.
Figure 1 Workers covering up the phrase, “Pilihan Yang Bijak: Barisan Nasional”
 
Note: The BN symbol (the scales) and the cross beside it were also covered up.
Source: Own source.
Access to money also buys labour. One KeADILan volunteer and I started
chatting to two other BN workers as we all strung up banners between trees
for our respective parties. They revealed that they were being paid MYR20
(USD5.60) an hour for their work. None of the workers in Sivarasa’s campaign
received any remuneration, and, if anything, faced disincentives to volunteering.
Another important monetary aspect is that candidates must submit a deposit
to the Electoral Commission. Malaysia’s deposit is among the most expensive
in the world (Brown 2005:433), a fortiori when the earning power of the
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ringgit is considered. For a federal parliament candidate, the total deposit
is MYR5,000 (USD4,200). By comparison, election deposits in Australia are
AUD250 (USD190), in Canada CAD200 (USD180), and in Ireland they are
unconstitutional. I might note that in Singapore, Malaysia’s neighbour, election
deposits are SGD13,000 (USD8,300). The size of the deposit in Malaysia makes
it difficult for candidates from poorer opposition parties, as well as independents,
to stand. A number of seats were won in walkovers when opposition party
candidates failed to source the deposit.
1.5 Machinery
The third M refers to machinery. That is, BN access to and manipulation of
state machinery. Case notes that the government “makes uninhibited use of state
facilities and government workers, especially in the Information Ministry and
the Kemas (Community Development) Unit” (2001:48). During the election,
other bodies such as the Electoral Commission, which oversees the running of
the election, appear to cooperate with the BN. I describe below one example of
collusion between the BN and the Electoral Commission that occurred just two
days before polling day.
1.5.1 The Electoral Commission
Since carrying out its first re-delineation of constituencies in 1960 which dissatis-
fied the BN, the Electoral Commission has lost ever more of its independence.
Graham K. Brown writes that it is “now widely seen by critics as little more than
a fig leaf for the government’s desired manipulation of constituency boundaries”
(2005:433). Brown notes that these re-delineations have, since 1986, increased
the political bias of the electoral system in favour of the BN (ibid.:430).
Active collusion of the Electoral Commission with the BN was evident in 2004.
Prior to the commencement of the campaign period, the Electoral Commission
had made clear that pondok panas were not permitted this year. A pondok panas,
in the context of an election, is rather like a large tent set up nearby to polling
stations. At a pondok panas, voters can find out where it is they must go to vote
and receive other related information.
In the days prior to the election, however, some volunteers in Sivarasa’s
campaign and I saw structures erected near polling stations that looked as if they
would be used as pondok panas on polling day. Our suspicion that collusion
had occurred between the BN and the Electoral Commission was revealed to
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be justified when, two days prior to polling day, the Electoral Commission
announced that pondok panas were to be permitted. The erected structures were,
indeed, used by the BN as their pondok panas. Given the late notice, Sivarasa’s
team was not able to set up their own pondok panas, although some opposition
campaigns managed to establish some in time.
1.5.2 Police and the Special Branch
It is widely accepted that the police and the BN cooperate in ways detrimental to
opposition parties. An example of this was given at the beginning of this chapter
when the police revoked and reissued a permit for a ceramah to the disadvantage
of the Sivarasa’s campaign and to the advantage of the Donald Lim. But possibly
the biggest disincentives to democratic participation come from the activities of
Special Branch personnel, as well as other people who act as informants.
In his eminent ethnography, Weapons of the Weak, James C. Scott also notes
the effect of SBs on political dissent in a rural Malay village. He writes,
[ . . . ] police from the Special Branch came twice to speak with Bashir
and with the headman, Haji Jaafar. The visits had their intended effect,
as I suspect they did in countless other villages on the rice plain. Many
PAS members knew that a word from Bashir or the [village committee]
could spell arrest and feared they would be victimized. As Mustapha
noted, “Of course we’re afraid; they want to crush (menindas) PAS” (Scott
1985:276-277).
SBs are a fact of life political parties. In an interview, KeADILan candidate Xavier
Jayakumar revealed to me that there were a number of people helping in his
campaign who were almost certainly informants. They had come “out of the
blue” to volunteer and seemed to loiter unnecessarily during meetings. When I
asked why he did not get rid of them, he replied that he was so short of helpers
that he could not afford to forgo their labour.
It was taken for granted by all the volunteers in Sivarasa’s campaign that
whatever they did or said could be monitored. When I enquired further about
this, members of Sivarasa’s campaign team, like some NGO workers with whom
I spoke, responded with a relatively uniform nonchalance. “So far as we care,”
said Latheefa Koya, Sivarasa’s campaign manager, “they can listen because we’re
not doing anything illegal. We don’t mind.”
On another occasion, Sivarasa explained to me that one thing he does when
SBs are at an event is to openly acknowledge their presence. He went on to tell
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me that if there are people who are unfamiliar with Malaysia or with SBs he will
even personally and politely introduce them to the officers. He does this firstly
to make the unacquainted aware of the SBs’ presence and also to demystify their
potentially menacing aura. This was what occurred when the SB was pointed
out to me at the ceramah described at the beginning of this paper.
However blasé those who are used to it may be, state surveillance poses a
significant deterrent to regular citizens’ participation in and support for opposi-
tion political parties. The woman described at the beginning of this chapter is
a case in point. Being photographed watching a public ceramah was enough to
distress her. The deterrent would be greater still to actively volunteering for an
opposition party candidate’s campaign or even standing as a candidate.
The ubiquity of the belief that people around you may be SBs or police
informants was made plain to me in a play by Huzir Sulaiman called “Election
Day” (published in Suliaman 2002). The play, which I saw in 2004, is set during
the 1999 elections and involves four main characters who are spoken about in a
monologue: one former rising star in PAS, one Democratic Action Party (DAP)
volunteer, the apparently politically unaffiliated monologist (all three of these
characters are house-mates) and a love interest. Of pertinence here is that the
former two characters suffer repeated setbacks in life which turn out to be the
result of the deliberate undermining by the narrator who reveals himself at the
end as a police informant.
That an audience could assimilate such a storyline suggests the pervasiveness
of the anxiety that even intimate acquaintances could be police informants.
Spying and surveillance form a part of the Malaysian national consciousness,
especiallywhen it comes to political involvement. Imight note that one volunteer
revealed to me that over the years, she had uncovered a few informants but had,
in the tensity of the 1999 elections, also wrongly accused a good friend.
1.6 Retribution and Surveillance
Retribution for antiestablishment views, and especially the fear of same, is a
common concern in Malaysia. In 2005, one academic claimed he lost his job
because of his critical views of the government. Another academic who had been
likewise critical only won a customarily ongoing tenure after public outcry when
it was initially denied (Welsh 2005). In 1999, the tenure of Chandra Muzaffar,
former Director of the Centre for Civilisational Dialogue, UniversitiMalaya, was
not renewed after his prominent role in the demonstrations against and criticisms
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of the government during the 1997-1998 Asian economic crisis and the sacking
and trial of former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. Fear of speaking
out is common among those employed by the state, even in non party political
circumstances. One Malaysian told me how his brother felt unable to openly
protest a staff appointment in his university for fear of negative repercussions.
The fear of personal retribution for voting against an oppressive government
or party is certainly why Article 21 of the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights
states that ballots in elections must be secret. Malaysian elections are not strictly
secret. The serial numbers of the voters’ ballot slips are recorded with the voters’
names on the electoral roll so that, in theory, a vote can be traced back to the
voter. Whether or not this ever occurs is immaterial in the context of Malaysia
where fear of retribution is ubiquitous (see also Case 2005:222).
1.7 Counter-surveillance and Counter-manoeuvres
As a digression and counter-point, I should note that the state is not the only
surveillant. A necessary component of every opposition campaign is the monitor-
ing of voters and the counting of ballots. Each contesting candidate can send a
“polling agent” to sit with the Electoral Commission representative and a BN
counterpart to match would-be voters with their names on the electoral roll.
These agents would ensure that a voter’s name matched that on the role and that
the photo on his or her identity card matched him or her. Once someone had
voted, their names would be ticked off so that they could not vote a second time.
A “counting agent” was a candidate’s representative who counted the ballots
along with the Electoral Commission and a BN counterpart to ensure accurate
tallying. It is widely assumed that without such opposition party polling agents
and counting agents (referred to together as PACA), ballot boxes would be
tampered with to the detriment of the non-BN party. However, as was the case
in Sivarasa’s campaign, opposition parties have difficulty finding enough PACAs
for polling day. Case notes that the government has been increasing the number
of polling stations to stretch the oppositions’ resources so that more counting
can occur without opposition observation (Case 2001:49).
On the day prior to polling day, Sivarasa’s PACAs assembled to hear a
presentation by a former Special Branch agent. At this presentation, the presenter
told of tactics used in previous elections by which the BN would cheat. These
included orchestrating black-outs during which ballot boxes would be exchanged
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or stuffed.2 Another tactic described was having one helicopter lift off with
the ballot boxes to take them for counting but having an altogether different
helicopter land with a different set of boxes. Other volunteers in Sivarasa’s
campaign shared with me stories of polling day in 1999. Zaitun Kasim, DAP
candidate for the seat of Selayang in 1999, told of how they followed the official
car carrying the ballot boxes to its destination to ensure it duly arrived there and
without interference.
Although the efficacy of these counter-measures is significant, they should
not be overstated. In all respects, the ruling coalition is better resourced, better
organised, and better funded.
1.8 Other Unfairnesses
In addition to those described above, there are a few other impediments that are
worthy of note. These practical impediments are in distinction to those described
in the next section which might be said to refer more to culture, or the national
consciousness.
In his analysis of statistics from the Malaysian general elections of 2004,
researcher Wong Chin-Huat outlines some systematic biases that advantage
the BN. The result of these biases, such as through gerrymandering – the last
redelineation of constituencies occurred in 2002 – was that “the opposition’s
voters are so under-represented that the ‘worth’ of a BN voter is matched only
by three DAP voters, seven PAS voters, or 28 Keadilan voters” (2005:317; for a
fuller discussion of gerrymandering in Malaysia see Brown 2005).
One of the number of irregularities that occurred on election day 2004 was
that thousands of voters could not find their names on the electoral rolls in
17 constituencies (ibid.:316). Some constituencies in Malaysia also showed
an unusually high number of unreturned ballots “exceeding 10,000 in two
constituencies – suggesting instances of ballot stuffing, ballot discarding, or
tampering with the numbers” (ibid.).
Wong also notes that a new rule had been introduced for the 2004 elections
which allowed a candidate to withdraw within three days after nomination
day. According to opposition candidates, BN candidates used this period to
attempt to bribe opposition candidates to withdraw (ibid.). In an interview,
2 Sivarasa’s PACAs were issued with flashlights and indeed, a blackout occurred in the con-
stituency of Gombak in 2004.
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KeADILan candidate Abdul Rahman Othman informed me that the person who
seconded his nomination had been “kidnapped” the night after nomination by
his opposition. The nominator was taken to the very house of the BN candidate.
The BN candidate, Othman told me, tried unsuccessfully to induce the seconder
to withdraw his nomination with offers of money, holidays and other incentives.
1.9 Two Corner Fights
Finally it must be noted that the winner of any seat is decided on a simple
first-past-the-post system. Losing parties cannot award preferences to other
parties and the upper house of Malaysian parliament is appointed and is not
composed of members of parties in proportion to the popular vote. BN coalition
parties never contest the same seat and opposition parties usually agree not to
compete against each other for a given seat so as not to divide the anti-BN vote.
If, for instance, a PAS candidate and a KeADILan candidate were both to stand
against a BN candidate in a given seat, the protest vote against the BN would
be divided and the opposition parties would have mutually undermined their
chances of winning. As a result, most contests for seats are “two corner fights”
because in “three corner fights” opposition candidates tend to knock each other
out. For this reason, a voter in Alor Setah in the state of Kedah, for example,
would have had to choose in 2004 between voting for either a PAS candidate or
a BN candidate for federal parliament. There was no KeADILan or DAP option.
Because seats are contested in two-corner fights, opposition parties must come
to agreements regarding which party will contest which seats. However, political
parties usually represent or are seen to represent particular ethnic groups. Indeed,
in peninsularMalaysia,with the exception of the BN’s Malaysian Indian Congress,
the other main parties are associated with either Chinese or Malays. The MCA,
Gerakan and the DAP are Chinese oriented. UMNO and PAS (in its religious
guise) are Malay oriented,3 as is KeADILan though to a significantly lesser extent.
This means that smaller ethnic groups or special interest parties cannot stand
without playing into the hands of the ruling coalition who they may regard as
the source of their problems. They cannot ransom their support to another party
in exchange for cognisance of their position on an issue. Along with the fact that
a protest vote against one party is indistinguishable from an affirmative vote for
3 Farish Noor notes that PAS was more clearly aMalay chauvinist party in the 1970s (2003:203).
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another, Malaysian general elections are very crude mechanisms for measuring
public sentiment and, as I have shown, are greatly biased against opposition
parties.
2 Fears of Ethnic Violence and the Memory of 1969
2.1 The Communal Riots of 1969: Causes and After-effects
As noted in earlier, the memory of the communal violence of 13 May 1969 is
recalled during election periods in Malaysia. Thus, no analysis of Malaysian
politics and elections fail to account for the after-effects of these riots. In
understanding the context of the riots, one should note that a census in 1931
revealed that Chinese and Indians, who are sometimes still referred to by some
Malays as pendatang or keturunan pendatang (arrivals or descendants of arrivals),
were more populous than Malays in Malaya. Along with the Orang Asli, Malays
are administratively classed as bumiputera, sons of the soil – that is, indigenous to
Malaysia. The sense of Malay ownership over what is now Malaysia (as Malaya
became in 1963) is evident in the name sometimes given to it, Tanah Melayu
(The Land of the Malays). The train network of Malaysia is still called the KTM
– Keretapi Tanah Melayu (Trains of the Land of the Malays).
With independence in 1957, a compromise known as “The Bargain” gave
citizenship rights to Chinese and Indians in exchange for political privileges
for Malays to ensure their political primacy in Tanah Melayu. In independent
Malaya, the Malays were in effect represented party-politically by UMNO which
was (and remains) the main constituent party in its coalition with the MCA and
MIC. UMNO’s dominant position within this coalition was to be a reflection
of the Malays’ position socio-politically within the nation. In 1969, however,
the citizenship rights of the Chinese and the Indians became evident when the
Chinese-dominated opposition parties, the DAP and Gerakan, made substantial
gains and broke the two-thirds majority held by the UMNO-MCA-MIC alliance
in parliament. This prevented the coalition from unilaterally making laws
and amending the constitution. It should also be noted that in the 1960s,
Chinese-dominated opposition parties were promoting a “Malaysian Malaysia”.
This construal of Malaysia gave no ethnic group political precedence and would
certainly have been regarded bymanyMalays as a transgression of “The Bargain”.
As a result of their electoral success in 1969, the DAP and Gerakan, held
celebratory rallies at which the Chinese crowds chanted insulting slogans at
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Malays. In response, Harun bin Haji Idris, Selangor’s Chief Minister called for
a pro-government demonstration. At this rally, Malay politicians claimed that
“Malay supremacy in government was being challenged by infidels and that they
needed to teach the Chinese a lesson” (Munro-Kua 1996:55). Immediately prior
to the demonstration, rumours that Malays had been attacked in another part of
Selangor reached the assembled crowd and two days of riots ensued. According
to official figures, six thousand people were made homeless and 178 people were
killed during the days of the riots. Unofficial figures, however, estimate a few
times this number of people were killed (ibid.:56). Most of those killed were
Chinese.
As noted in the previous chapter, suspicions and animosities had existed
between the Chinese and Malays since the time of British colonialism. The
UMNO-MCA-MIC coalition attributed the sentiments vented on 13May 1969
to frustrations over the perceived relative economic “backwardness” of the
Malays as compared to the economic (and ascending political) superiority of the
Chinese. During the period of emergency which was declared following the riots,
the government developed its “New Economic Policy”, known as the NEP, which
sought, it was claimed, to remove the correlation between race and economic
function. It was, in effect, affirmative action that accorded benefits to Malays
when it came to, for example, education and business licences.
2.2 Melayu dalam bahaya (Malays in Danger)
A reason that continues to be proffered by both Malays and non-Malays for the
continuation of privileges is that if Malay benefits were removed, they would
be unable to compete against members of other ethnicities (Fenton 2003:139).
One commonly cited example is with regard to university placements. As one
Malaysian lamented to me, “non-Malays with straight As cannot get in [to local
universities] whereas Malays with the poorest of marks do.”
In 2004, at the fifty-fifth UMNO General Assembly, Prime Minister Abdullah
Badawi said that Malays must be able to face the challenges of the global
environment. He went on to say that,
Umno has a duty to help the Malays become stronger, more able,
confident and courageous [ . . . ]. But in undertaking all these efforts,
Umno should also prepare the Malay mind to face the realities of this
world [ . . . ]. If we fail to hone the competitive skills of the race, we will
eventually become a defeated race. Malays will always be looked down
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upon, always feel insecure and lack confidence and be seen as a burden
by others (Badawi 2004).
It is sometimes observed that Malay discourses exhibit an underlying if not overt
sense of being under threat. Virginia Matheson Hooker, in an examination of
Malay novels until 1980, discovered consistent warnings that the Malay race
and homeland were under threat of being overwhelmed by foreign races and of
being overtaken in the march towards modernity (2000).
In March 2005, UMNO launched a programme entitled “Melayu Dalam
Bahaya” (“Malays in Danger”). The programme consisted of seminars and
included postings on UMNO affiliated websites that criticised Malays for their
failings and implied that other races were taking advantage of them (Nazirin
2005).4 Azwanddin Hamzah of KeADILan condemned the sentiments as seditious
and said, “if there is a riot, don’t blame the opposition” (ibid.).
What is telling in Hamzah’s statement is the association of opposition parties
with riots which required no expounding upon by the journalist. There has
thus evolved a complex of closely connected ideas in Malaysian ethno-political
discourse: the threat to Malay precedence and security by a Chinese-dominated
opposition has developed into a fear of political instability should the BN lose
dominance to the opposition per se.
Indeed, the fear of ethnic violence is sometimes less an implicit fear than it is
an explicit threat. At the same UMNO General Assembly cited above, UMNO
deputy chairperson Badruddin Amiruldin waved a book about the 1969 riots
in the air and warned that any challenge to Malay privileges would be akin to
stirring a hornet’s nest.
“Don’t poke at this nest, for if it was disturbed, these hornets will
strike and destroy the country,” he said to a thunderous applause from
delegates attending the party’s 55th annual general assembly at the Putra
World Trade Centre in Kuala Lumpur. [ . . . ]
“Fifty-eight years ago we had an agreement with the other races, in
which we permitted them to ‘menumpang’ (temporarily reside) on this
land. In the Federal Constitution, our rights as a race have been enshrined.
“Let no one from the other races ever question the rights of Malays
4 Similarly in August 2006, the Youth deputy chief, Khairy Jamaluddin, who is also the Prime
Minister Badawi’s son-in-law, warned UMNO members that party in-fighting would “pave way
for the Chinese Malaysians to make various demands to benefit their community” (Beh 2006).
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on this land. Don’t question the religion because this is my right on this
land,” said the fiery orator to another round of applause (F. Aziz 2004).
Like any identity, the social construction of Malay identity is contested and
variegated. Michael Herzfeld rightly points out, however, that “life consists of
processes of reification and essentialism as well as challenges to these processes”
and that the strategic character of essentialism should be recognised (1997:26).
The words of Amiruldin attempt to arouse the support and mobilisation of an
ethnic constituency. On this point and in the context of a discussion on elections,
it is worth noting that Jean-Paul Sartre has noted that elections interpolate people
as identical with othermembers of the group to which they are deemed to belong.
“[The voter] becomes in essence identical with all the other members, differing
from them only by his serial number” (1977:201). Thus, “serial thinking is born
in me, thinking which is not my own thinking but that of the Other which I am
and also that of all the Others” (ibid.:201-2).
In the fast car ofMalaysian politics, differences and details become blurred or
ignored as attention is focussed upon landmarks. In the context of inter-ethnic
politics these landmarks – pertinent symbols of ethnic identity on to which people
imbue their own meanings (see Cohen 1996) – enable people to self-ascribe to
ethnic identities just as, by and large, people usually unproblematically self-ascribe
to a gender. And just as people regard members of their own and other genders
as having stereotypical traits, likewise do members of an ethnicity conceive of
themselves and pertinent others according to stereotypes which seem true.
2.3 The Malay Stereotype and its Political Ramifications
Unfortunately, in my view, the traits attributed to Malays by both Malays and
non-Malays are often negative. One association frequently made is of Malays’
and poor performance. An example of such an attribution occurred when a
young woman told me that she wanted to travel overseas to Canada or Australia
to study architecture. I discovered that she had enrolled and already begun an
architecture course locally but stopped. “The education is terrible,” she said. In
a whisper, she went on to explain, “They are Malays.” Not being certain of her
meaning I enquired further and she added, “The teachers are Malays and it is
easy for them to pass and so they aren’t very good. If you ask them a question,
they just give any answer. But this is a class and we need proper answers. Also,
before exams, they give hints and no-one bothers studying.”
It is frequently said that the various affirmative action policies for Malays
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have resulted in, as Prime Minister Badawi put it, Malays becoming dependent
on crutches. It is also sometimes said that Malays have developed a “subsidy
mentality.” The implications are, as evident in Badawi’s address cited above, that
Malays are unable to compete with non-Malays on a level playing field whether
locally or internationally. There have been various well-publicised attempts
by UMNO politicians to craft positive identities for Malays to strive towards.
These include the New Malay (Mahathir), the Towering Malay (Badawi) and
the Glocal Malay (Najib Tun Razak). These formulations usually emphasise
economic competitiveness and Islamic piety. But as models to strive towards,
they imply characteristics that Malays are supposed to currently lack; inspiring
heights of excellence (Towering Malay), or bravery with a global outlook (Glocal
Malay).
The manner in which members of a social category are constituted undoubt-
edly affects the individuals who are given to belong to that category. Iris Marion
Young, in her analysis of feminine bodily comportment, argues that the more a
girl assumes her feminine status the more she enacts those behaviours that are
socially taken to be feminine (1990:154). The inhibited bodily comportment of
females that Young describes has its source “in neither anatomy nor physiology,
and certainly not in a mysterious feminine essence.” Rather, it has its source “in
the particular situation of women as conditioned by their sexist oppression in
contemporary society” (ibid.:153; emphasis original). Indeed, Young points out
that “Every human existence is defined by its situation” (ibid.:142; emphasis
mine; cf. Kapferer 1988:19).
With this mind, the Malay situation in the context of Malaysia combines
characteristics which could understandably predispose Malays to respond to
challenges to their hegemony with outrage. Or, to put it more precisely, which
allows Malay politicians to frame with efficacy challenges to their power as a
challenge to the wider Malay ethnic in-group by a threatening out-group or
other. The situation and characteristics to which I here refer are first a sense
of entitlement to privileges in their land, Tanah Melayu, and second, insecurity
over the ability ofMalays to retain this position on merit owing to their apparent
non-competitiveness.
The idea that ethnic Malays may, when they feel threatened, cheated or perse-
cuted, quickly turn to physical violence or rioting entered national consciousness
with episodes such as the Maria Hertogh affair (see Hughes 1980) but most
importantly in 1969. The capacity for violence of the kind seen on 13 May 1969
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has a more famous parallel at the level of the individual in the phenomenon of
amok.
2.4 Running Amok
The phrase, “to run amok” refers in colloquial English to an act wanton unruly
behaviour. The first account of it is from fifteenth century Indonesia. It was
described as a condition or phenomenon that is associated with the Malay people
(Hatta 1996:505). E. K. Tan and John E. Carr describe amok as,
a standardized form of intense emotional release, accepted by the
community and expected of any male individual who is placed for some
reason or other in an intolerably embarrassing or shameful situation. The
indiscriminate killings are considered a continuation of revengeful feelings
[ . . . ]. The Amok must re-establish himself in the eyes of his fellow man
and proceeds to do so by a “violent assertion of his power” – the only
court of appeal known to his fathers for countless generations (1977:59).
The violence associated with an amok episode is simultaneously regarded as being
indiscriminate and yet purposive and revengeful. Carr and Tan note that the
subjects aver “that the act is unconscious, indiscriminate, and without purpose”
but that several of those who had run amok “exhibited a remarkable degree of
purposiveness” (1976:1297). One subject they noted had killed five Chinese in
three separate coffee houses frequented by Chinese and that he had previously
expressed anger towards the Chinese for the 1969 riots (ibid.). All accounts of
amok describe the role of the amok in restoring lost dignity or in saving face (see
ibid.; Kon 1994).
The violent riots of 1969 may appear to be a social manifestation of Malay
amok (for a treatment of such social amok in Indonesia, see van Dijk 2002).
Indeed, this association was made explicit by Mahathir Mohamad. In a widely
circulated letter to the then Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, Mahathir
criticised him for “giving the Chinese what they demand. [ . . . ] The Malays have
run amok, killing those they hate because you have given them too much face”
(quoted in Munro-Kua 1996:56). I might note that the amok phenomenon is
frequently regarded as being born of culturally emphasised courtesy and self-
effacement which “may lead others, interpreting such diffidence as weakness and
inferiority, to take advantage of [the Malay]” (Carr and Tan 1976:1298).
Sir Stamford Raffles (1781-1826) noted that the threat of amok protects the
dues of a Malay and of the Malays generally. He wrote that the Malay was
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“prepared to avenge with the kris [traditional dagger] the slightest insult on the
spot; but with the knowledge that such an immediate appeal is always at hand,
prevents the necessity of its often being resorted to” (quoted in Hatta 1996:506).
2.5 Amok as Moral Outrage
This response, I think, can clearly be seen to be a form of existential redress.
Indeed, as Jackson has written,
all violence is a form of retribution. A form of payback, driven by
the need to reclaim something that one imagines to have been wrongfully
taken, that one is now owed. One’s very existence is felt to depend on
making good this loss – a legacy stolen, a promise broken, a loved one
murdered, one’s honor impugned, a dream betrayed (2004:155).
Amok also fits Ward Goodenough’s description of moral outrage and its causes.
Goodenough writes that in all human societies of which there is record,
social relationships are ordered in terms of rights and duties that
pertain to comembership in groups and to dealings between various
categories of person and categories of subgroups within the larger group
(1997:12).
He goes on to say,
we are outraged when inappropriate behaviour is exhibited toward us,
or toward those with whom we identify, by people with whom we do not
closely identify ourselves – by people we think of as others rather than as
us, but as others who are still presumably bound by the same expectations
as we are in regard to what is appropriate behaviour (ibid.:15; emphasis
original).
Goodenough regards moral outrage in humans as the manifestation of territorial
behaviour which is evident in other animals (ibid.:25). Ethologically, territory
is that space which an animal is prepared to defend and it does so with what
seems to be an “enhanced power or energy” (ibid.:16). The intruder, meanwhile,
“seems to be inhibited by its sense that it is intruding and usually withdraws in
response to the territorial defender’s aggressive display” (ibid.).
Territoriality in humans, Goodenough argues, “involves (among other things)
social identities, rights and privileges in identity relationships, and the immuni-
ties the rights and privileges provide” (ibid.:18). Goodenough regards Erving
Goffman’s “territories of the self ” as describing some of these human territories.
These include one’s “informational preserve” which refers to information about
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ourselves which we wish to control, and one’s “personal space” around one’s
body. Most relevant to my discussion here is that of “the turn.” According to
Goffman, the turn refers to,
the order in which a claimant receives a good of some kind relative
to other claimants in the situation. A decision-rule is involved, ordering
participants categorically (“women and children first,” or “whites before
blacks”), or individually (“smallest first, then next smallest”), or some
mixture of both (Goffman 1971:35).
Thus, elaborates Goodenough,
turns can take many forms, and can be looked upon as the archetype
of rights and duties in jural relationships. For me to claim a turn as my
right means that others have a corresponding duty to let me have my turn.
Turns include such things as having our turn to talk and having our day
in court. They include virtually all of what we call our “entitlements”
(Goodenough 1997:19).
Returning to the Malays in the Malaysian context we can see why the character-
istics of inter-ethnic relations take the dynamics that they do given the way in
which these inter-ethnic relations have been articulated. In short, Malays are
positioned as bumiputera, the “sons of the soil” of their land, Tanah Melayu.
Their land was intruded upon by colonial forces and by the pendatang. The
Malays were not only unable to repel them, but they threatened and still threaten
to displace Malays. The Bargain, supplemented by the NEP, articulates the just
entitlements ofMalays inMalaysia. Threats to the social position or the privileges
of Malays by non-Malays are therefore in effect a threat to the entitlements to
Malays, an usurpation of their “turn,” that is, what is their due. This potential
usurpation is threatened by, as Bridget Welsh puts it, a “domestic ‘other’” in the
form of the Chinese (2004:120). Given what Goodenough tells us of the human
territories, we can expect such intrusions and usurpations to elicit an energetic
defensive response or a defensive display (i.e. a threat). This is what we see in
the events of 1969 and the orations of Amiruldin respectively.5 The fear amongst
5 Why then might it be that other indigenous populations, such as aboriginal Australians, do not
display or continue to display such defensive behaviour towards those (or the descendants of those)
who dispossessed their forefathers of their land? The answer probably lies in whether members
of such groups feel sufficiently confident in winning any show of force they might make. Jackson
has described the responses of different people to atrocities committed in Sierra Leone. Whereas
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non-Malays ofMalay retribution for challenges to their political dominance as
represented by the BN plays a significant role in maintaining the BN’s political
dominance in Malaysia. As suggested earlier, there lingers a lasting association
with opposition electoral success and social instability which is manipulated by
the BN for electoral success.
3 Conclusion
The electoral dominance of UMNO and the BN is maintained by both practical
measures and a broader cultural environment. The former entails the creation of
various laws and the cooperation of ostensibly politically neutral state apparatuses
to hinder opposition parties and to advantage the BN.No less important, however,
is the cultural or ideological environment in which support for opposition parties
is associated with political instability, and support for opposition parties is
hampered by a sense of ubiquitous surveillance and potential retribution.
Whereas the formermanipulations aremore clearly contrary to fair democratic
procedure, the manipulation of popular fears of surveillance and social instability
are not. Although inter-ethnic divisions and tensions may have evolved, they
have scarcely abated in the years since independence and thus the potential for
large-scale ethnic violence to reoccur seems plausible. Thus, the likelihood of
electoral support for the BN is enhanced and BN victory made likely through
practical obstructions to fair electoral contestation by opposition parties.
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